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agreed, stating that the fraud claim
was separate from the CERCLA
claim. The court therefore remanded the attorney fee award for reduction by the amount apportioned to the fraud claim.
Gopher appealed the district
court's deferral of the damages
award. Gopher argued that this
retention of jurisdiction was erroneous under Minnesota law and
also violated its Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial on the
issue of damages. The court of
appeals held that the district court
was correct in allowing out-ofpocket damages. However, the calculation of the damages should not
have been postponed until the
cleanup was substantially complete. Instead, the award should
have been made promptly by using
expert testimony to estimate the
value of the property upon completion of cleanup.
Union Fully Responsible For
CERCLA Cleanup Costs
On the CERCLA claim, Union
contended that the "as is" clause of
the purchase agreement transferred liability for the cleanup
from Union to Gopher. Additionally, Union argued that CERCLA
allows apportionment of liability
among all responsible parties,
therefore the apportionment of the
full cleanup liability to Union was
unfair.
The court of appeals upheld the
district court's decision, stating
that the allocation of liability under CERCLA is an equitable determination made by the district
court's factual findings and legal
conclusions. The evidence showed
that Union knew of and was responsible for the extensive, toxic
pollution. In addition, the district
court had found that Gopher had
not materially contributed to the
pollution and had no knowledge of
the pollution until an investigation
was ordered by the Authority. The
appellate court held that because
Gopher was fraudulently induced
into entering into the purchase
agreement, the "as is" clause was
invalid and did not serve to transfer liability to Gopher.
The court of appeals also disagreed with Union's contention
that Gopher should not have reVolume 4 Number 4/Fall, 1992

covered attorney fees for the CERCLA claim. Quoting the statutory
language in both CERCLA and
MERLA that expressly allows the
awarding of attorney fees to the
prevailing party, the court of appeals found the district court's
decision appropriate to the extent
that the attorney fees awarded to
Gopher were applied to the CERCLA claim and not to the fraud
claim.
Monica A. Murray

Eleventh Circuit Finds
That All Relevant
Circumstances Must Be
Considered Before
Voiding A Foreclosure
Sale
In Grissom v. Johnson, 955 F.2d
1440 (11 th Cir. 1992), the United
States Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit held that before a
court can revoke a residential foreclosure sale, it must be persuaded
that the foreclosure sale price was
not the reasonably equivalent value of the property. However, in
this case, the record lacked specific
facts regarding the circumstances
of the foreclosure sale, so the court
of appeals remanded the case back
to the lower court.
Background
In 1971, Johnny Grissom
("Grissom") took out an $18,000
home loan from Citizens and
Southern National Bank ("C&S")
and secured the loan with his residence. Subsequently, Grissom defaulted. After C&S notified Grissom about the bank's intention to
foreclose on his home, the bank
advertised the foreclosure sale
once a week for four weeks. On
April 4, 1989, the property was
sold to Birnet Johnson ("Johnson") for $14,059, the amount
Grissom owed on the note to C&S.
One day after this sale, Grissom
and his wife filed for Chapter 13
bankruptcy protection. One month
later, they filed a complaint in the
United States Bankruptcy Court
for the Southern District of Georgia seeking to revoke the foreclosure sale.

Lower Courts Void
Foreclosure Sale
In bankruptcy court, Grissom
argued that under federal bankruptcy law, the foreclosure sale
should be nullified. The court
agreed and found that the only
substantial question was whether
the sale price of $14,059 was a
reasonably equivalent value of the
Grissom residence. The court relied upon the "Durrett 70% Rule",
set forth by a prior Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Durrett v. Washington National Insurance Co., 621 F.2d 201 (5th Cir.
1980), which established that in
order to meet the reasonable
equivalency standard, a property
must be sold during a foreclosure
sale for at least 70 percent of its
actual market price.
The bankruptcy court found
that the sale price was less than
$26,000, 70 percent of the property's market value. Since the sale
did not meet the Durrett Rule, the
bankruptcy court ruled that the
foreclosure sale was void. C&S
appealed this decision to the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Georgia.
The district court also relied
upon the Durrett dictum and affirmed the order of the bankruptcy
court. The district court mechanically analyzed the issue of reasonably equivalent value and held that
the bankruptcy court correctly followed the general rule that a sale
for less than 70 percent of the fair
market value is less than a reasonably equivalent value. C&S appealed to the United States Court
of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.
Eleventh Circuit Reverses, Using
Totality of Circumstances Rule
On appeal, C&S argued that
both the bankruptcy court and
district court relied too heavily on
the Durrett test while ignoring other potentially relevant factors. The
Eleventh Circuit agreed and rejected the lower courts' dependence on
the Durrett test. In doing so, the
court relied on its recent decision
that a determination of reasonable
equivalency requires a consideration and analysis of the totality of
the circumstances surrounding a
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foreclosure sale.
Also, the court noted that Congress did not intend to make a
fixed percentage the sole determining factor of reasonable equivalence. Instead, the decision maker
should consider other relevant factors, such as the bargaining position of the parties, the marketability of the property, and the context
of a lawful foreclosure.
The court of appeals found that
the lower court incorrectly presumed a foreclosure sale brought
unreasonable prices if a foreclosing
party fails to prove otherwise. Instead, the court noted, a lawfully
conducted foreclosure sale is presumed to bring reasonably equivalent value. Furthermore, the foreclosure price-to-market value
percentage is only one factor rebutting this presumption of reasonableness. Courts must also consider other factors, such as fair
appraisal of the property, advertisement of the foreclosure sale,
and competitive conditions surrounding the sale.
Accordingly, the court of appeals concluded that the Durrett
70 percent test should no longer be
mistaken as the law of the Eleventh
Circuit. Instead, the proper way to
determine a property's reasonable
equivalent value is to conduct a
thorough investigation into all the
relevant facts and circumstances.
Competing Policy Concerns
Now Met
The Eleventh Circuit concluded
that the totality of the circumstances test properly balanced the competing interests of the borrower's
equity rights and the secured creditor's concerns. While depending
solely on the Durrett Rule to void a
foreclosure sale might advance
bankruptcy policy, it violates the
policy of protecting a secured creditor's rights. Courts, therefore,
must conduct a thorough analysis
of the facts and circumstances surrounding the foreclosure sale to
ensure that a foreclosing party
takes all commercially reasonable
steps to protect the competing interests of both parties.

Case Remanded Back
To District Court
Because the record contained no
facts about the circumstances surrounding the foreclosure sale, the
appellate court was unable to determine whether the foreclosure
sale price was the reasonable
equivalent of the property's value.
For example, the court could not
decide if the bank took the reasonable commercial steps necessary to
protect the debtor's equity in the
property. The record also contained no facts regarding the competitive conditions surrounding
the sale or the bank's efforts to
appraise the value of the property.
Thus, the appellate court vacated
both lower court orders and remanded the case to district court
for further proceedings.
Sharon Hannaford

California Supreme Court
Finds School Transportation
Fees Do Not Violate The
State's Constitution
In Arcadia Unified School District v. State Department of Education, 825 P.2d 438 (Cal. 1992), the
Supreme Court of California concluded that charging fees for school
transportation did not conflict
with either the free school guarantee or the equal protection clause
of the California Constitution.
Taxpayer Wins Initial Suit
In 1985, Francisco Salazar ("Salazar") filed a taxpayers' suit in
Ventura County, California
against the State Department of
Education, the State Board of Education, the Superintendent of Public Instruction, and the Fillmore
Unified School District ("Educators"). Salazar claimed that the
Educators' implementation of
§39807.5 of the California Education Code (Deering 1992), which
authorized school districts to
charge fees for student transportation, violated the free school guarantee and the equal protection
clause of the California Constitution.
The Court of Appeals, Second
District, Division Six, found it
unnecessary to join the school dis-

tricts as parties to the litigation and
concluded that §39807.5 violated
both the free school guarantee and
the equal protection clause of the
California Constitution. The Supreme Court of California denied
review of the appellate court decision and ordered that it not be
officially published. On remand,
the Ventura County Superior
Court entered a judgment against
the Educators.
School Districts' Suit Involved
Same Issue
Following the superior court's
order, the State Department of
Education ("Department") notified all school districts that
§39087.5 was unconstitutional and
instructed them to discontinue
charging for transportation. However, many school districts that
were not parties to the original
action did not follow the Department's directive because of their
belief that §39807.5 was constitutional. Twenty-five school districts
implemented an action in the Sacramento Superior Court against
the Department to determine
whether §39807.5 was constitutional on its face.
Salazar was permitted to be included as a party and moved to
dismiss the lawsuit, arguing that
the Department and the school
districts, as agents of the Department, were bound by the prior
decision in his taxpayer suit. The
superior court denied the motion
to dismiss and held that §39807.5,
on its face, violated the free school
guarantee of the California Constitution.
The Court of Appeals, Third
District, unanimously reversed,
holding that the school districts
were not bound by the judgment in
the earlier action. The appellate
court found that the public interest
mandated such a conclusion and
therefore, did not reach the issue of
whether the school districts were
agents of the Department. The
appellate court also ruled that
§39807.5, on its face, did not violate either the free school guarantee or the equal protection clause
of the California Constitution.
This decision was appealed to the
California Supreme Court.
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